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INTRODUCTION
From 1920 until 1976, the United States government treated
individual income tax information as a general government as-
set.' During that period, the Internal Revenue Service (Service)
regularly disseminated tax information which could be identified
with a particular taxpayer to government officials; frequently,
these officials were able to obtain the information without reveal-
ing their reasons for requesting it.2 By the early 1970's, federal
agencies requested millions of tax returns each year.3
Congress, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, substan-
tially revised the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code con-
cerning tax return confidentiality. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
rejected the concept that tax information is a general government
asset. Section 6103 of the Code, which sets forth the general rules
governing the disclosure of tax information, was amended to pro-
vide that tax return information "shall be confidential" and no
one with access to it shall disclose it "except as authorized" by the
Code.4 This fundamental change resulted in part from
t Associated with Rogers & Wells, New York, New York. B.A. 1971, St. Lawrence
University; J.D. 1974, Union University, Albany Law School.
tt Member of Orans, Elsen, Polstein & Naftalis. B.A. 1967, S.U.N.Y. Buffalo; J.D.
1971, Columbia University School of Law.
When this Article was written, the authors were members of the Federal Legislation
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. As committee members,
the authors prepared a study which was printed in the May-June 1979 issue of The Record
of that Association. This Article is an expanded version of that study. The views expressed in
this Article are those of the authors, and not those of the Federal Legislation Committee.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Charlynn Goins and Halsey B. Collins,
members of the committee, and the committee itself for its opinions and criticism. We
especially wish to thank Steven B, Rosenfeld, the committee chairman, for his help in the
preparation of the original committee report.
1 See generally REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 94-266, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 832 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT].
2 Id. at 845-46.
3 Id. at 855.
4 I.R.C. § 6103(a). Section 6103, entitled "Confidentiality and disclosure of returns
and return information," provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule-
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as au-
thorized by this title-
(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
(2) no officer or employee of any State or of any local child support
enforcement agency who has or had access to returns or return informa-
tion under this section, and
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Watergate-related events in the 1970's where evidence was uncov-
ered that President Nixon may have had income tax audits and
investigations initiated and conducted in a discriminatory manner
for purposes unrelated to the collection of taxes.5 The net effect
of the amendments was to limit access by the President, Congress,
White House employees, federal agencies, and others to tax in-
formation.
This Article analyzes the policy considerations underlying the
1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) that pro-
vide generally for confidentiality of information filed with the
Service by and about individual taxpayers. We focus on the most
important provisions of those amendments which deal with tax
information that can be identified with a particular taxpayer, re-
gardless of whether the information is filed directly by that tax-
payer.
6
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had
access to returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii) or
subsection (n),
shall disclose any returns or return information obtained by him in any manner
in connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or
under the provisions of this section. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"officer or employee" includes a former officer or employee.
5 For example, during the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the
impeachment of President Nixon, it was revealed that the former President had requested
and attempted to obtain confidential information contained in income tax returns from the
Internal Revenue Service allegedly for political and other purposes not authorized by law.
President Nixon had also endeavored to cause income tax audits and investigations to be
initiated and conducted in a discriminatory manner. Statement of Information: Hearings Pur-
suant to H.R. 803 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Book VIII, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1974); (transcript of conversation among H.R. Haldeman,
John Dean and President Nixon, Mar. 13, 1973); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IM-
PEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. RP. No. 1305,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 141-45 (1974). See generally ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at
830-31. This appears to have been one of the prime reasons which motivated Congress in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to revise the provisions of the Code concerning tax return
confidentiality. See S. REP. No. 938 (PART 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 317, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3746.
This Article considers only tax return information relating to individuals and does
not deal with access to such information as it relates to businesses, estates and other entities.
Nor does it discuss access by all persons or entities which arguably have some need for tax
information. In particular, this Article does not discuss the provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code concerning access by (1) the taxpayer or other private persons with a material
interest in a taxpayer's return, such as a co-signatory of a joint return (I.R.C. § 6103(e));
(2) the Renegotiation Board (I.R.C. § 6103(i)(5)); (3) the Comptroller General (I.R.C. §
6103(i)(6)); (4) the Social Security Administration and Railroad Retirement Board (I.R.C. §
6103(1)(1)); (5) the Department of Labor and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(I.R.C. § 6103(l)(2)); (6) the Department of Treasury for purposes of resolving personnel
matters (I.R.C. § 6103(1)(4)); (7) the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (I.R.C.
§ 6103(l)(5)); or (8) federal, state and local child support agencies (I.R.C. § 6103(1)(6)).
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I
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURNS
A. The Need for Confidentiality
An individual's federal income tax return contains many in-
timate details about his personal and financial life. Besides the
nature and source of income, the return reveals an individual's
assets and liabilities, the identity of business associates, dependents
and charities, marital status, alimony payments, political contribu-
tions, medical and dental expenses, casualty losses and union
membership.
The taxpayer has a legitimate interest in maintaining the con-
fidentiality of such matters.' When, however, the government at-
tempts to determine whether the taxpayer has paid the appro-
priate amount of tax, that expectation of confidentiality must give
way. Thus, in civil or criminal investigations of tax-related mat-
ters, no policy reason justifies depriving the government of tax
information. Problems arise, however, when disclosure is sought
for non-tax purposes, for example, by the Department of Justice
for investigation of non-tax crimes. When non-tax issues are in-
volved, there are conflicting policy considerations.
In favor of privacy is the personal nature of the return in-
formation. The only reason the Service requests such data is to
make sure people pay what they ought to. It may be argued,
therefore, that no use unrelated to tax collection should be
sanctioned.
The individual's interest in privacy is reinforced by the nature
of our tax collection system. Returns are not submitted voluntarily
to the Service; rather, they are filed under the threat of substan-
tial criminal and civil penalties.' If given a choice, most individu-
7 The public policy against disclosure of income tax returns has been expressed by
one federal court as follows:
The protection of the data contained in Federal tax returns is an essential
part of our scheme of taxation. Individuals and corporations have the right to
expect that information contained in tax returns will not be made available by
the government to the public. The policy of confidentiality for income tax data
encourages the full disclosure of income by taxpayers in that the individual or
corporate taxpayer is assured that his neighbor or competitor will not be ap-
prised of the intimate details of his financial life.
Association of Am. Railroads v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 114, 116 (D.D.C. 1974).
" See I.R.C. §§ 6651-56 (consequences of failure to file); 7201-15 (criminal sanctions
concerning obligation to file return and to pay taxes). For example, § 7203 of the Code
1979] 943
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als would almost certainly prefer that the information contained
in their tax returns not be made available to the public or to
government agencies for non-tax purposes. 9 Indeed, most
Americans are probably unaware of the availability of tax returns
to various persons and governmental entities.' 0 This nation's
self-assessment tax collection system may work, moreover, only
because taxpayers assume that the information they provide is
used for computation of taxes, not for other purposes." There
is a substantial risk that collections would be adversely affected if
taxpayers believed there was widespread improper use of tax in-
formation.
Disclosure of tax information may also implicate constitu-
tional concerns. In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Garner v.
United States,'2 a non-tax criminal prosecution, that an individual
has a fifth amendment right to refuse to supply information on a
tax return. Once information is disclosed, however, he can not
subsequently claim it is privileged. 3 In short, while a taxpayer is
not a "volunteer" when he files information 14 and thus is entitled
which proscribes, inter alia, the willful failure to file a return, states:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or
required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a
return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015), keep any
records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax
or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the
time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penal-
ties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution.
In the event an individual fails to make a return, the Service has the right to complete the
return administratively, "from [its] own knowledge and from such information as [it] can
obtain through testimony or otherwise." I.R.C. § 6020(b)(1). See also I.R.C. § 7602 (right to
examine books and witnesses for purpose of making return where none has been made).
9 A recent public opinion poll conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, Inc. stated that
38% of those polled believed that the service asks for too much personal information.
Thirty-seven percent of those sampled felt that the service should do more to maintain the
confidentiality of personal information. Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. AND A. WESTIN,
THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 26, 30 (1979).
10 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 829, 832.
Our country's self-assessment system of taxation is virtually unique. Widespread use
of information a taxpayer provides to the Internal Revenue Service, for purposes unre-
lated to tax administration, may diminish the taxpayer's willingness to cooperate with the
Service by voluntarily filing an accurate tax return. See THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 540 (July 1977) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. In United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975), the
Supreme Court stated, "basically the Government depends upon the good faith and integ-
rity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability."
12 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
1 Id. at 653-55. See also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970).
'4 See 424 U.S. at 652.
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to some protection, he must claim that protection at the time of
filing. 5 The Court further held that an individual cannot be
convicted for failing to file a return if he files one in which he
validly asserts his fifth amendment rights.
16
" The Supreme Court had previously held in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259,
263 (1927), that a taxpayer could not refuse to file a return on the basis of his fifth
amendment privilege. In that case, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, indicated in
dictum that the privilege could be claimed against specific disclosures required by the re-
turn:
It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amend-
ment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his in-
come because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test
that or any other point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be
passed upon.
Id. at 263-64.
16 424 U.S. at 662-63. Under certain limited circumstances one may refuse to file
completely. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (prosecutions for
failure to file returns required of gamblers in connection with federal occupational and
excise taxes on gambling). As the Supreme Court noted in Garner, prior decisions had
found that any disclosures made in connection with the payment of those taxes
tended to incriminate because of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling
activities. Marchetti, supra, at 48-49; Grosso, supra, at 66-67. Since submitting a
claim of privilege in lieu of the returns also would incriminate, the Court held
that the privilege could be exercised by simply failing to file.
424 U.S. at 658.
Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974, there was no statutory requirement
that taxpayers be notified that the Service could disclose tax information to other agencies.
Under the Privacy Act, the Service is required to disclose the following information in
soliciting the filing of individual income tax returns:
(A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order of the
President) which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether dis-
closure of such information is mandatory or voluntary;
(B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the information is in-
tended to be used;
(C) the routine uses which may be made of the information, as [such uses
are) published [in the Federal Register at least annually in a notice of the exis-
tence and character of the Service's system of records which includes the
categories of user of the records and the purpose of each use]; and
(D) the effects on [the taxpayer] of not providing all or any part of the
requested information...
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(A) to (D) (1976). The "Privacy Act Notice" which was included in the
information booklet accompanying the 1978 Federal Income Tax Form 1040 stated:
The Privacy Act of 1974 says that each Federal agency that asks you for infor-
mation must tell yod:
a. Its legal right to ask for the information and whether the law says you must
give it.
b. What major purposes the agency has in asking for it, and how it will be
used.
c. What could happen if the agency does not receive it.
For the Internal Revenue Service, the law covers:
* Tax returns and any papers filed with them.
Any questions we need to ask you so we can-
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The fifth amendment protection, however, does not extend
to the masses of information provided to the Service by persons
and entities other than the taxpayer, such as banks, credit card
agencies, and informers. As a general rule, the taxpayer may not
claim fifth amendment protection for records that are not in his
possession.1
7
All these considerations militate in favor of granting some
protection to taxpayers against disclosure of tax information for
non-tax purposes. On the other hand, many government
agencies-federal, state and local-make legitimate non-tax use
Complete, correct or process your return.
Figure your tax.
Collect tax, interest, or penalties.
Our legal right to ask for information is Internal Revenue Code sections
6001 and 6011 and their regulations. They say that you must file a return or
statement with us for any tax you are liable for. Code section 6109 and its
regulations say that you must show your social security number on what you
file. This is so we know who you are, and can process your return and papers.
You must fill in all parts of the tax form that apply to you. But you do not
have to check the boxes for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund.
We ask for tax return information to carry out the Internal Revenue laws
of the United States. We need it to figure and collect the right amount of tax.
We may give the information to the Department of Justice and to other
Federal agencies, as provided by law. We may also give it to States, the District
of Columbia, and U.S. commonwealths or possessions to carry out their tax
laws. And we may give it to foreign governments because of tax treaties they
have with the U.S.
If a return is not filed, or if we don't receive the information we ask for,
the law provides that a penalty may be charged. And we may have to disallow
the exemptions, exclusions, credits, deductions, or adjustments shown on the
tax return. This could make the tax higher or delay any refund. Interest may
also be charged.
Please keep this notice with your records. It may help you if we ask you for
other information.
If you have questions about the rules for filing and giving information,
please call or visit any Internal Revenue Service office.
This is the only notice we must give you to explain the Privacy Act. How-
ever, we may give you other notices if we have to examine your return or
collect any tax, interest, or penalties.
Although this notice responds, in part, to the issues raised in Garner, it fails to inform the
taxpayer that he must claim his right to fifth amendment protection at the time of filing.
We would also suggest that notice should be provided in "plain English" on the income tax
form itself.
17 The elements of possession are complex. Compare Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 336 (1973) (Court refused to permit taxpayer to use fifth amendment to shield papers
he had turned over to his accountant) and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976)
(Court held that accountant's work papers which taxpayer had delivered to his attorney
were not protected) with United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1959) (tax-
payer records stored in safe on premises of corporation headed by taxpayer held within
ambit of fifth amendment protection).
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of federal tax information. The Department of Justice regularly
employs tax return information in the investigation and develop-
ment of criminal cases involving both revenue and non-revenue
offenses; state and local governments use federal tax information
to administer and enforce their own tax laws; congressional com-
mittees use tax information in connection with the drafting of tax
and other legislation; and various statistical gathering agencies, in-
cluding the Bureau of the Census, use tax return information in
conducting demographic, economic and agricultural statistics
programs.18 No doubt our nation is well served by the detection
and prosecution of crimes, by statistical studies based on accurate
data, and other similar uses of tax information.
In recent years, however, Congress and the public have be-
come increasingly aware that tax returns and tax return informa-
tion have been used for purposes neither authorized nor intended
by Congress."9  Much attention has been focused on the use of
tax information for non-tax purposes and the proper limits on
that use. Such concerns have arisen periodically during the de-
velopment of the United States tax system.
B. Historical Background
Congress first provided for an income tax in 1861.20 Soon
thereafter a public debate developed over whether tax returns
should be open to public inspection; in 1864, Congress enacted
legislation providing for disclosure. 21  Apparently Congress be-
lieved that opening tax returns to public inspection would pro-
mote the detection of fraudulent returns.22 In 1870, however,
Congress explicitly prohibited publication of tax returns, 23 and
abolished the tax itself as of 1872.24
In 1894, Congress reenacted the income tax.25  The new law
provided anti-disclosure provisions and also established penalties
for unauthorized disclosures. 26 The Act was declared unconstitu-
tional in 1895.27
s See generally ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 875-1002.
'9 See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
20 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 8, 12 Stat. 292 (repealed 1872).
21 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 218, 228 (repealed 1870).
22 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 836.
23 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259.
24 Id. § 6. See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 838.
25 Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509.
26 Id. See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 839.
27 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583, 586 (1895). This case was
in effect overruled in 1913 by the sixteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
19791
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The income tax was reinstated by Congress in 1913,28 along
with a provision that tax returns constituted public records. Re-
turns would be open to inspection only upon the order of the
President or pursuant to rules and regulations prescribed by the
Sectretary of the Treasury and approved by the President.2 9
These provisions established the basic pattern which governed tax
return disclosure until 1976.
Initially, only corporate income tax returns were available for
government inspection. It was not until 1920 that individual in-
come tax returns became available. 30  From then until the early
1970's, governmental entities increasingly used individual tax re-
turn data pursuant to regulations issued by the Treasury Depart-
ment or by order of the President.
31
At first, tax return data were available only to Treasury De-
partment employees. Within a short time, state tax officials, the
Department of Commerce, various Senate committees, United
States Attorneys, the White House, and others were granted ac-
cess. 2  Access was so easy that certain government agencies did
not have to specify the name of the taxpayer or the reasons for
the inspection.
33
By the early 1970's, federal agencies were requesting millions
of tax returns each year. During the first half of 1974, over 20
million tax returns were provided to the Department of Com-
merce and others pursuant to blanket regulations.34 Over 15,000
additional returns were provided to the Department of Justice
and United States Attorneys for investigative purposes alone.
35
which provides that "[tihe Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and with-
out regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI.
28 Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114.
29 Id. § 2(G)(d).
30 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 845. At that time, the Service promulgated
regulations providing for certain limited usage of individual tax return data by govern-
ment entities. Id. See T.D. 2961, 2 C.B. 250 (1920).
31 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 845.
32 Id. at 845-46.
3' Access to tax information was often granted pursuant to "blanket regulations." AD-
MINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 845-46.
"4 Id. at 855. The vast majority of these returns were requested by the Department of
Commerce solely for census compilation. Id.
'5 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-1(g) to (h) (1967).
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1. The Privacy Act of 1974
Congress, by enacting the Privacy Act of 1974,36 prohibited the
federal government from disclosing information without the con-
sent of the individual to whom the record pertained,37 unless the
intended disclosure was covered by one of the Act's exceptions or
exemptions.3 8  The Act's stated purpose was to protect individual
privacy by restricting disclosure of records maintained in federal
agency "information systems."39
While tax returns appear to be covered by the Privacy Act,
the Act's broad exceptions negate any practical effect.40 Under
the Act, a government agency is permitted to obtain individual
information for "routine use" (i.e., a use compatible with the pur-
pose for which it was collected),4' for "investigative purposes" (i.e.,
a non-compatible use), or for other authorized law enforcement
activities. 42  A congressional committee can obtain tax information
for any purpose related to matters within its jurisdiction.
4 3
At the time the Privacy Act was enacted, Congress recognized
that tax returns required special rules governing disclosure. It
therefore created the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Pri-
vacy Commission) 44 and authorized it to report to the Congress
36 Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
38 Id. For a general discussion of the conflicting objectives of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. I 1977), and the Privacy Act, see Karmel &
Benedict, Business Confidentiality Under Attack-Freedom of Information and Privacy, 1 CORP. L.
REV. 72 (1978). Although the Freedom of Information Act has resulted in the publication
of taxpayer information not previously available, the Act does not apply to matters that are
specifically exempted from disclosure by other federal statutes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
Therefore, the Act does not require the disclosure of "tax returns" and "return informa-
tion" which may not lawfully be disclosed under § 6103 of the Code. See Black, The Freedom
of Information Act and the Internal Revenue Service, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, THIRTY-THIRD
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 683; Rosenbloom, More IRS Information May Become Public
Due to Amended Freedom of Information Act, 45 J. TAx. 258 (1976).
'9 Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896.
40 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, FEDERAL TAX RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY
15 (June 1976) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
4' 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1976); see id. § 552a(a)(7).
41 Id. § 552a(b)(7). The exception specifically pertains to federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. Id..
13 Id. § 552a(b)(9). In addition, the Privacy Act's exceptions permit the disclosure of
confidential information concerning an individual-without the knowledge and consent of
the individual-to the Bureau of the Census for activities related to census and surveys (id.
§ 552a(b)(4)), and to recipients who have provided assurances that the information will be
used solely for statistical research (id. § 552a(b)(5)).
"4 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(a), 88 Stat. 1896.
1979] 949
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and the President on a number of issues, including "whether the
Internal Revenue Service should be prohibited from transferring
individually identifiable data to other [federal] agencies and to
agencies of State governments." 45
Congress and the Privacy Commission conducted numerous
hearings concerning the proper non-tax use of tax return infor-
mation.4" In June 1976, the Privacy Commission issued an in-
terim report, in which it recommended more stringent restrictions
than those provided by the Privacy Act of 1974 4 1 or the Internal
Revenue Code.48 Congress, in enacting the Tax Reform Act of
1976, adopted many of the Commission's recommendations, in-
cluding the fundamental concept that tax returns should be re-
garded as confidential.49
In July 1977, the Privacy Commission issued its final re-
port,50 which, while endorsing most of Congress' actions, also rec-
ommended several additional changes. Since then, an unsuccessful
attempt was made to amend the Code to adopt those changes.55
Further attempts are expected.52
2. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
The basic premise of the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 is that there shall be no disclosure of tax returns and return
information5 3 for uses other than tax administration unless Con-
45 Id. § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii).
46 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Mar. 11 & 12, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
" 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
48 See generally INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40.
49 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
50 COMMISSION REPORT, -supra note 11.
" H.R. 8287, introduced by Congressmen Koch and Goldwater on July 13, 1977, in-
corporated each of the Privacy Commission's revisions. At the expiration of the 95th Con-
gress last November, the bill was still pending before the House Committee on Ways and
Means.
- Congressman Goldwater has introduced an identical bill, H.R. 354, in the 96th Con-
gress. That bill is currently pending before the House Committee on Ways and Means.
5' The terms "tax returns" and "return information" have specific limited meanings
under the Code. A "return" is defined to mean any tax return, claim for refund, amend-
ment, supporting schedule or attachment filed on behalf of or in respect to any person.
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1). "Return information" includes, among many other things, the tax-
payer's identity; the nature, source or amount of income, payments, receipts, deductions,
net worth, tax liability, deficiencies, etc.; data received or prepared by the IRS regarding a
return; information regarding actual or possible investigations; and any background
documents. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2). Significantly, the term "return information" only includes
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gress has enacted specific statutory provisions authorizing such
disclosures.54 The Tax Reform Act also amended section 7213 of
the Code to provide stricter penalties for unauthorized disclosure
of tax information. Moreover, the Act authorizes a private
right of action for taxpayers allegedly damaged as a result of un-
lawful disclosures.56
Section 6103 of the Code, which took effect on January 1,
1977, authorizes the following persons to receive tax information
in which an individual's identity is revealed: persons designated by
the taxpayer; 5 7 state tax officials; 58 persons having a material in-
terest (e.g., the taxpayer, a spouse, partners, certain sharehold-
ers); 59 congressional committees; 60 the President; 61 White
House personnel and the heads of federal agencies in connection
with "tax checks"; 62 the Treasury Department and the Depart-
ment of Justice in civil and criminal cases; 63 federal agencies in
non-criminal tax cases; 64 and the General Accounting Office.
6 5
In addition, various other federal agencies, such as the Bureau of
the Census, can obtain tax return information for statistical use.
66
In the remainder of this Article, we shall analyze some of the
more important provisions of the Tax reform Act and determine,
in each case, whether the government's arguments for access out-
data in a form which can be associated with, or otherwise identify, a particular taxpayer. Id.
In this Article, the terms are generally used interchangeably.
For a further discussion of these terms as well as an additional analysis of the Act's
provisions, see Corey, Confutentiality of Tax Returns, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, THIRTY-SIXTH
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1265, 1269-72 (1978).
54 I.R.C. § 6103(a). In this respect, Congress reversed its long-standing presumption
that tax returns were public records which could be made available upon order of the
President or pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department.
See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
" See notes 261-66 and accompanying text infra.
56 I.R.C. § 7217. See notes 269-72 and accompanying text infra.
57 I.R.C. § 6103(c).
58 I.R.C. § 6103(d).
59 I.R.C. § 6103(e). While the taxpayer is given unrestricted access to his own returns,
his access to information filed about him by others is conditioned on the determination by
the Secretary of the Treasury that access would not impair tax administration. Chamber-
lain v. Kurtz, [1979] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (79-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9211 (5th Cir.
1979).
60 I.R.C. § 6103(0.
61 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(1).
62 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2).
c3 I.R.C. § 6103(h).
64 I.R.C. § 6103(i).
65 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(6).
66 I.R.C. §§ 6103 (j) and (k).
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weigh the individual's interest in confidentiality. It is the premise
of this Article that tax information should be given only to those
persons who have shown a legitimate'need and only after adequate
safeguards have been established to preserve privacy.
II
INVESTIGATIONS INTO VIOLATIONS OF THE TAX LAWS
An individual is required to file a tax return so that the tax
collecting agency may determine whether he is paying the correct
tax. Therefore, the Code permits those employees of the Depart-
ment of Treasury who are charged with making such determina-
tions to have access to tax return information.6 7  When tax in-
formation is sought for tax-related purposes by other government
agencies, such as the Department of Justice for investigation of
tax evasion, it is arguable that access should be just as easy. Con-
gress, however, was troubled by this proposition
n.6
The Code provides that tax returns and return information
submitted by a taxpayer who is under investigation shall be dis-
closed to officials of the Department of Justice and the United
States Attorneys' offices for use in any civil or criminal (including
federal grand jury) proceeding,6 9 if that taxpayer's tax liability is
at issue.70 A different rule, however, governs disclosure of re-
67 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(I). In this respect, the taxpayer may reasonably expect his return tc
be scruntinized by such individuals.
68 The Privacy Commission articulated its concern in terms of the Service's ability to
threaten serious punishment if the taxpayer refused to disclose information. ComraImssxoN
REPORT, supra note 11, at 537. While not articulated, underlying that concern is the con-
stitutional protection against self-incrimination embodied in the fifth amendment.
69 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A) permits disclosure if "the taxpayer is or may be a party to
such proceeding." While the Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided that only attorneys work-
ing for the Department of Justice could have access, § 503 of the Revenue Act of 1978
permits officers and employees, as well as attorneys, to have access. Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§ 503, 92 Stat. 2763. Nevertheless, the regulations reinforce the statutory emphasis on
confidentiality by providing:
Disclosure of a return or return information to a person other than the tax-
payer to whom such return or return information relates or such taxpayer's
legal representative to properly accomplish any purpose or activity described in
[the statute] should be made ... only if such purpose or activity cannot other-
wise properly be accomplished without making such disclosure.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(h)(2)-l(b)(1) (1978).
70 The Second Circuit has held that this provision includes the case in which an indict-
ment alleges both tax and non-tax offenses. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 40 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
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turn information submitted by one taxpayer which pertains to
another taxpayer. 71  If the taxpayer who provides the informa-
tion is not under investigation, the Department of Justice may ob-
tain the information only if (1) the treatment of an item reflected
on the return is or may be relevant to the "resolution of an issue"
pertaining to the liability of the person under investigation,7 2 or
(2) there is "a transactional relationship" 73 between the third
party and the taxpayer under investigation which affects or may
affect the resolution of an issue in the proceeding.
74
Once tax returns or return information are turned over to
the Department of Justice for use in a tax-related matter, they
may be disclosed in a subsequent tax-related proceeding if (1) the
taxpayer is a party,7 5 (2) the information "is directly related to the
resolution of an issue in the proceeding," 76 (3) there is a transac-
tional relationship between a party and the one who supplied the
information about the party,77 or (4) federal criminal discovery
rules require disclosure.78 In exercising its discretion under the
criminal discovery rules, a court must "give due consideration to
congressional policy favoring the confidentiality of returns and re-
turn information." 79  Moreover, no disclosure may be made if
71 Typical examples of "third-party" information are bank records, the records of a
credit card agency, or the statements of an informer.
72 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B).
73 The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided the following exam-
ples of "transactional relationships": returns of Subchapter S corporations, partnerships,
estates, and trusts. S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 325-26 (1976), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3754-56. The Senate Report notes an additional
example: a corporation's return showing wages paid to a taxpayer when the issue is
whether the taxpayer paid over the proper amount of withholding taxes. Id.
74 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C). The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 states:
[R]estrictions were imposed in certain instances ... with respect to the use of
third-party returns where, after comparing the minimal benefits derived from
the standpoint of tax administration to the potential abuse of privacy, the
committee concluded that the particular disclosure involved [i.e., total unfet-
tered disclosure] was unwarranted.
S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 325 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3754. It should be noted that Department of Treasury officials
are not similarly limited by statute to tax uses, although the seeming disparity may be the
result of a belief that a bureaucratic morass would result if IRS officials had to apply for tax
information each time they desired it.
75 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A).
76 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B).
7 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).
78 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D).
79 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D).
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the Secretary of the Treasury determines that "disclosure would
identify a confidential informant or seriously impair a civil or
criminal tax investigation." 8
The statutory scheme also precludes collateral uses of tax in-
formation. Prior to the Tax Reform Act, government attorneys
routinely used returns and return information to impeach the
credibility of witnesses. 8 ' The Act apparently precludes such use
by permitting tax return information of a third party whose own
tax liability is not at issue to be used in a court or administrative
proceeding only if it "directly" relates to an issue in the proceed-
ing.82 This prohibition reflects the congressional belief that the
privacy of witness-taxpayers is more important than the possibility
that a government lawyer may be able to impair a witness' credi-
bility. Prior practice also allowed the government but not the de-
fense access to tax information. Although this problem could have
been avoided by granting the defense equal access, that solution
would only have exacerbated the privacy problem by increasing




A. The Department of Justice and U.S. Attorneys' Offices
Although taxpayers may have a reasonable expectation that
their returns will not be used for non-tax investigations, tax re-
turn information plays a prominent role in the discovery and
prosecution of violations of federal law. Harold Tyler, then Dep-
uty Attorney General, has stated that tax returns are extra-
ordinarily helpful in getting to the facts in so many contexts." 83
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 notes the
following contexts: counterfeiting, forgery, loan sharking, mail
fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, illegal pay-
ments and loans to labor unions and employees, bribery, illegal
80 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
81 See S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3754.
82 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B). But see S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 326
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3755 ("[Tlhe return of a
third-party witness could not be introduced in a tax proceeding for purposes of discredit-
ing that witness except on the item and transactional grounds...").
'3 Hearings, supra note 46, at 75 (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler
on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice).
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kickbacks, bank and investment frauds.84  Tax information has
been a major weapon in the prosecution of organized crime.
85
A simple example demonstrates the potential importance of
tax information. In a case involving the alleged receipt of a bribe,
the defendant may claim that he was paid the money for services
rendered. It would be probative if his tax return showed he did
not declare the money as income.86
The Department of Justice's regular requests for tax informa-
tion areowell documented. During a three month period shortly
before the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Service
made over 1,000 disclosures of tax return information to the Jus-
tice Department and United States Attorneys' offices. 87  In 1975,
the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys' offices requested
nearly 26,000 tax returns of over 6,000 persons.88
In sum, tax return information appears to play a prominent
role in the discovery and prosecution of violations of federal law.
This is, and should continue to be, an important consideration in
determining right of access.
Although this extensive use of tax return information poses a
potential threat to personal privacy, proponents note that there
have been few abuses over the years. Judge Tyler testified in 1976
that there was no "hard evidence of any substantial abuses of tax
returns by [Department of Justice] lawyers in all the many, many
years .... ,,89 While we agree that the abuses have been few and
far between, the Nixon years exposed the great potential for
abuse,90 an abuse not limited to the White House.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 places significant procedural
limitations on the procurement of tax information for non-tax
purposes when the information is sought directly from the Ser-
vice. 9' As a general rule the Act limits access to the prosecution
84 S. REP. No. 938 (PART 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3437, 3756-57.
85 Id.
16 Hearings, supra note 46, at 75, 79 (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Harold
Tyler on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice).
87 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, App. 2, at 57.
8 See S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3757.
89 Hearings, supra note 46, at 56-57. Judge Tyler said there was one instance of abuse
by a young Assistant U.S. Attorney who was discharged. Id.at 57.
90 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
91 Government prosecutors may still attempt to obtain tax information directly from
the taxpayer or from third parties. See Maggio v. Hynes, 423 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
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of crimes; 92 civil enforcement authorities such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission are denied access.93 The Act also
provides that tax return information in the files of the Service
may be obtained only if a federal district court first approves the
disclosure. 94 The procedure is ex parte, 95 and only the head of
the agency may apply for it.96 A court may grant an order per-
mitting disclosure if (1) there is "reasonable cause to believe,
based upon information believed to be reliable, that a specific
criminal act has been committed," 97 (2) the information is "proba-
tive evidence of a matter in issue related to the commission of
such criminal act,""9 and (3) the information cannot be obtained
"from any other source, unless ... the information sought consti-
tutes the most probative evidence of a matter in issue." 99 The
Secretary of the Treasury may withhold information if he certifies
that "disclosure would identify a confidential informant or seri-
ously impair a civil or criminal tax investigation."' 0
No court proceeding, however, is required to obtain informa-
tion which the Service has received from third parties. 1 1 The
Secretary of the Treasury must disclose such information upon
written request from an agency identifying only the name and
address of the taxpayer,10 2 the taxable period, 103 the agency's
92 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(A).
" See notes 127-31 and accompanying text infra.
94 I.R.C. §6103(i)(1)(A).
9' Id. The ex parte procedure has been upheld by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Barnes, No. 78-1040, slip op. at 5621-22 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1979). The court refused to
imply an exclusionary sanction for violations of the Tax Reform Act since "none appears in
the Tax Reform Act itself and since civil and criminal penalties have been expressly pro-
vided. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7213(a) (criminal penalties), 7217 (civil remedies in favor of taxpayer)."
96 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B). In the case of the Justice Department, the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General may authorize an application.
Id. In United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 320 (1978),
the court strictly construed that Act's requirement that the application be made by the
designated officials of the Department of Justice. The court reasoned: "When Congress
chooses to speak with such specificity, courts must heed its language." Id.
97 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
98 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(ii).
99 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(iii). As a matter of pure logic this cannot mean that the gov-
ernment must first ask the taxpayer for the information. The obvious reason for the ex
parte procedure is to avoid notice to the taxpayer, which would be defeated by requiring
inquiry of the taxpayer before going to court.
100 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1).
1"1 See I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2).
102 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A).
103 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B).
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statutory authority to conduct an investigation or proceeding,10 4
and the "specific reason" why disclosure is material.10 5  The re-
quest need not be limited to prosecution of a federal crime, one
of the limitations set forth for obtaining information submitted by
the taxpayer. 10 6 The Secretary of the Treasury may refuse dis-
closure of third-party information for the same reasons noted
above with respect to information submitted by the taxpayer.' 7
Neither the ex parte procedure for obtaining information
submitted by a taxpayer nor the written request procedure for the
third-party information comport with the Privacy Commission's
recommendations. The Commission's basic tenet was:
[A]uthorizing the IRS to disclose individually identifiable tax in-
formation to another agency for a purpose unrelated to the
administration of a Federal tax law is seldom defensible unless
the Congress would be willing in principle to compel individu-
als to disclose the same information directly to the agency re-
questing it from the IRS.
[T]he Commission believes that Federal law enforcement
officials should not have easier access to information about a
taxpayer when it is maintained by the IRS than they would
have if the same information were maintained by the taxpayer
himself.1 08
The Commission found no principled distinction between
third-party information and information obtained from the tax-
payer. The Commission recommended that, in all non-tax investi-
gations and proceedings, the taxpayer receive notice of the re-
quest for information and that a federal district court approve the
disclosure. Approval was to be conditioned upon a showing of
"probable cause" to believe a crime had been committed. The re-
questing agency would also have to show that the information was
"probative evidence" that the crime had been committed and that
there was no legal impediment preventing the agency from ob-
taining the information directly from the taxpayer.' 0 9 The
104 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2)(C).
105 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2)(D).
106 See I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2).
107 I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2). See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
10s COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 540-41, 553.
109 See id. at 557. H.R. 354, which was introduced in the 96th Congress by Representa-
tive Goldwater, would enact a probable cause standard with notice to the taxpayer and
provide a right to contest access with respect to both taxpayer and third-party source in-
formation. See note 44 supra.
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Commission further proposed that the court's approval should be
a final order subject to appellate review. 110
1. Probable Cause and Notice
"Probable cause" is the phrase which is used in the fourth
amendment to govern searches and seizures."' "Probable cause
... exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's
knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reason-
able caution to believe that an offense has been or is being com-
mitted." 112 As the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 makes clear, reasonable cause "is intended to be less strict
than the 'probable cause' standard for issuing a search warrant
and this requirement is to be construed according to the plain
meaning of the words involved." 3 The Privacy Commission
construed "reasonable cause" to mean that a judge must find
"some basis to believe that a crime has been committed," a re-
quirement which it thought would be easy to satisfy." 4
In his testimony before the Privacy Commission, Judge Tyler
argued that the probable cause standard would preclude the Jus-
tice Department from obtaining necessary information, which
would seriously hamper its effectiveness. He testified that it is
often impossible to determine whether a white collar crime has
been committed until the Department makes a careful financial
"10 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 62.
... The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
112 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
"' S. REP. No. 94-938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 333 ('1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439,3758.
"' Commission Report, supra note 11, at 555. Some courts have used the terms "reason-
able cause" and "probable cause" interchangeably. See, e.g., People v. Blackman, 81 Misc. 2d
12, 14, 364 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707. (Queens Co. 1975); People v. Lombardi, 18 A.D.2d 177, 239
N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1963). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has interpreted
"reasonable cause" to impose "a less stringent requirement than that of 'probable cause'."
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612-13 (1977). Ramisev involved an interpretation of
19 U.S.C. § 482, which permits searches of vessels by certain government officials.
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analysis, aided by a review of tax return information. 115 As for
giving the taxpayer notice, former United States Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell testified that notice could provide an opportunity
for delay: "IT]he astute tax evader knows, even a year's delay may
spell the difference between a successful and a fruitless investiga-
tion." 116
The comments of former Attorney General Bell and Judge
Tyler appear valid. The same can be said of the right to appeal
the ex parte order-if the taxpayer can appeal, he will have an
additional tool to use in interfering with investigations of his con-
duct which may unnecessarily hinder legitimate law enforcement
efforts. In addition, if the probable cause standard precludes ac-
cess, the government may be forced to indict an individual before
it has analyzed all available evidence, including exculpatory evi-
dence, or to forego prosecution of crimes, especially business-
related crimes.
The Department of Justice's need for tax return information
to detect crimes, while compelling, is not necessarily dispositive. In
most instances, local police and other law enforcement officials
have just as legitimate a need to search premises for evidence of
crimes within their jurisdiction as the Department of Justice has to
review tax information. Unquestionably, the probable cause stan-
dard results in fewer crimes being detected. Yet the probable
cause standard has evolved as the proper balance of the individu-
al's right to privacy and society's need to detect crimes.'
17
Moreover, although a taxpayer, having submitted a return, cannot
invoke the protection of the fifth amendment," 8 the compulsion
inherent in the tax reporting system supports some measure of
protection.
Assuming federal judges interpret "reasonable cause" to re-
quire some evidentiary showing of a possible criminal violation,
the Act's ex parte procedure appears to adequately protect the tax-
115 Hearings, supra note 46, at 81. Judge Tyler was then Deputy Attorney General.
"6 Administrative Summons and Anti-Disclosure Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 5 (1977) (statement of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell); see Hearings, supra note
46, at 153-56, 161-62 (testimony of Stanley Sporkin on behalf of the SEC).
117 See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959) ("The vivid memory by the newly
independent Americans of [Crown] abuses produced the Fourth Amendment as a
safeguard against such arbitrary official action by officers of the new Union.").
Il" See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
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payer." 9 Given the novelty of the procedure and the substantial
arguments against a higher standard of proof or notice to the
taxpayer, the procedure should be permitted at least for a limited
period of time so that its workings may be analyzed. It will un-
doubtedly be easier in the coming years to monitor the ex parte
procedure to determine if it is being abused, than to determine
whether federal prosecutors are being unduly hampered by a
probable cause standard or by notice to the taxpayer.
1 2 0
2. Third-Party Source Information
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 does not require a court order or
notice to the taxpayer before the Service may disclose third-party
source information.1 21  Congress apparently concluded that fifth
amendment concerns are implicated only when information is
sought directly from the taxpayer. 22  Third-party information
includes not only information supplied by informers, but also
bank and credit card records about a taxpayer, and returns and
other information filed by persons who are connected to a tax-
payer (e.g., trustees or executors) or who have engaged in business
with a taxpayer (e.g., suppliers or customers).
119 In one of the few reported decisions regarding an ex parte application, Judge Nicker-
son of the Eastern District of New York held that before such an order could be granted,
the judge must be permitted to review the requested material in camera. He found author-
ity for his holding in the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. United States v.
Praetorius, 451 F. Supp. 371, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), citing S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. 329 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3758.
This ruling, if followed by other courts, is a healthy sign that federal courts will carefully
review gofernment applications for ex parte orders.
120 During a debate on these problems, certain members of the Federal Legislation
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York had recommended a
two-tier structure. Initially, the government would have to prove probable cause in an ex
parte proceeding. If the court holds the government has failed to prove probable cause, the
government could be given a second chance, with the taxpayer given notice and the right
to contest disclosure. At this second proceeding, however, the government would have to
show only reasonable cause. Such a two-tier procedure does have the beneficial effect of
recognizing the government's legitimate need for information and the serious risk of giving
notice to taxpayers, while at the same time increasing the protection available to the tax-
payer by initially requiring probable cause.
121 See discussion at note 101 and accompanying text supra. Compare I.R.C. § 7609, which
requires that the taxpayer be given (1) notice of any summons served by the Service on a
"third-party recordkeeper" requiring the production of records relating to the taxpayer
and (2) the right to intervene in any proceeding with respect to the enforcement of such
summons. See United States v. Desert Palace Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] STAND. FED.
TAX. REP. (CCH) 9292 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 1979) (gambling casino which extends credit is
third-party recordkeeper); United States v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 450 F. Supp. 472 (D. Md.
1978) (oil company which issues credit cards not third-party recordkeeper).
122 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 556.
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The Privacy Commission argued that third-party information
required protection just as much as information filed by the tax-
payer because our society is structured to necessitate -maintenance
of various records.'2 3 The Privacy Commission reasoned that
while it is a necessary evil for the Internal Revenue Service to
have easy access to monitor the tax system, it is quite another
thing to provide such information to agencies investigating non-
tax matters. 12 4  Court review may be necessary to ensure that a
criminal investigation is not based on inaccurate, outdated or false
material, and that the information is sought for a proper purpose.
There are at least two countervailing considerations. As pre-
viously discussed,1 25 a taxpayer enjoys no constitutional protection
with respect to information about him in the hands of others.
Further, a requirement of court approval of the many requests
for third-party information would impose a substantial burden on
the court system. While that burden is mitigated by making the
procedure nonadversarial-the applicant should in most cases be
able to demonstrate its need for and right to the information-
the administrative problem is nevertheless a potentially serious
one.
On balance, we agree with the Privacy Commission that
third-party source information should be subject to the same pro-
tection as information submitted by the taxpayer. The risk of
abuse is just as great while the concomitant burden on the gov-
ernment of obtaining an ex parte order is no greater. As noted
above, 26 the ex parte procedure provides the taxpayer sufficient
protection from abuse while allowing prosecutors to act without
undue hindrance. Congress can deal with the potential burden on
the federal courts if that risk becomes manifest.
B. Civil Investigations -The SEC
Congress has proscribed use of tax returns and return infor-
mation by federal agencies for civil litigation purposes, except
121 See COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 556. For example, a taxpayer-citizen must
have bank accounts and access to credit.
124 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 556-57. It should be noted that none of
the witnesses who testified before the Commission appears to have focused on third-party
information.
125 See notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra.
,2 See notes 119-20 and accompanying text supra.
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where specifically authorized by the Act.12 The SEC is not
among the agencies so authorized.
12 8
Arguably, access is not so essential for the SEC or any other
federal agency investigating or prosecuting non-tax civil cases that
it outweighs the taxpayer's privacy interests. Federal agencies such
as the SEC possess adequate investigatory powers to obtain tax
returns and other information either directly from the taxpayer
via the agency's own investigative subpoena powers, 129 or through
third-party sources. If there is enough evidence of a violation, the
SEC may commence a civil action and request the tax information
under the federal discovery rules. 3 ° Moreover, the Department
121 As a general rule, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 permits disclosure of tax returns and
return information for non-tax purposes only upon a showing of "reasonable cause to
believe ... that a specific criminal act has been committed." I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(i) (em-
phasis added). Prior to the Tax Reform Act, tax information was available to the Depart-
ment of Justice for defending suits seeking money damages for injury or wrongful death,
for instituting civil fraud claims against private parties, and for determining the ability of a
party to pay a judgment. Other executive departments and establishments of the federal
government could obtain tax information in connection with matters officially before them
and for evidence in proceedings conducted by or before a federal agency. The legislative
history of the Act points out, however, that such uses of tax information in non-tax civil
cases "were not warranted in light of the invasions of privacy involved and the fact of the
alternative sources of information available." S. REP. No. 94-938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 331 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3760.
128 In addition to permitting access by the Department of Justice for civil proceedings
involving tax administration (I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2)), the Code permits the Renegotiation
Board to receive and use such information to implement certain provisions of the Re-
negotiation Act of 1951, and to disclose such information to the Department of Justice if
the Board deems legal action appropriate (IR.C. § 6103(i)(5)); section 6103(l)(1) authorizes
the disclosure of returns and return information to the Social Security Administration and
the Railroad Retirement Board in connection with the administration of certain statutory
provisions under their jurisdiction; and section 6103(I)(2) sanctions disclosure of returns and
return information to the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration in connection with their civil and criminal administration and enforcement of the
provisions of Title I and IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission and the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare also receive returns and return information for civil purposes pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 6103 (1), (3) and (5). See Letter from Charles L. Saunders, Jr., Acting Chief Counsel of
the Internal Revenue Service, to Harvey Pitt, General Counsel to the SEC (March 21,
1977) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
129 The Securities and Exchange Commission has power under both the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to conduct investigations into possible
violations of the federal securities laws, including subpoenaing witnesses, taking evidence,
and requiring the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the Com-
mission deems relevant or material to the inquiry. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1976); 15 U.S.C. §§
78u(a), (b) (1976). It may also seek enforcement in any U.S. district court of any subpoena
duces tecum issued in the course of its investigations. 15 U.S.C. 88 77v(b), 78u(c) (1976).
130 Income tax returns do not enjoy an absolute privilege from discovery. St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1961); Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry &
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of Justice, not the SEC, has ultimate responsibility for prosecuting
criminal violations of the securities laws, and it can obtain tax in-
formation by following the ex parte procedure outlined above.'31
The SEC appeared at the Privacy Commission hearings and
argued for its continued access to tax return information for use
in civil non-tax investigations. Stanley Sporkin, Chief of the SEC's
Enforcement Division, testified that a denial of access would seri-
ously hamper the effectiveness of SEC investigations of civil se-
curities laws violations. He stated that while the SEC often obtains
leads of possible misconduct, it is not always possible to identify a
particular violation of the securities laws; only after other evi-
dence is sifted, including tax return information,' 32 can the SEC
determine whether a violation has occurred.'33 Mr. Sporkin also
contended that there had not been one complaint served against
the SEC for having improperly used tax return information.1
34
It is clear that a certain degree of duplication of investigative ef-
fort will be avoided if the SEC is given access to IRS files.
Section 6103 should be further amended to permit access by
the SEC to tax returns and return information upon terms similar
to those which govern access by the Department of Justice and
Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975). Many courts, however, have recognized
a public policy against the unnecessary public disclosure of tax returns. E.g., Premium Serv.
Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d at 229; Cooper v. Hallgaren & Co., 34 F.R.D.
482, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). One of the factors considered by the courts in determining whether to
allow discovery of tax returns is whether the information is readily obtainable by other
means or from other sources; courts may also permit access where the taxpayer has put the
amount of his income in issue. See, e.g., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55
F.R.D. 512, 514-15 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. at
557-58; Kingsley v. Delaware Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
"'1 See notes 94-100 and accompanying text supra. The Tax Reform Act may permit any
federal agency to obtain tax return information if it can demonstrate reasonable cause to
believe that criminal violations have occurred. The authors are not aware of any attempt by
the SEC to make such a showing.
"I2 In 1974 the SEC made 15 requests for information about 82 taxpayers and 360
returns; in 1975, it made 12 requests concerning 21 taxpayers and 121 returns. Hearings,
supra note 46, at 139 (testimony of Stanley Sporkin, Chief, Bureau of Enforcement, SEC).
The three-month study conducted by the Privacy Commission in 1976 shows that the SEC
obtained 28 disclosures from the Service during that period. COMNIsSION REPORT, supra
note 11, App. 2, at 57.
"I Hearings, supra note 46, at 152-54. For example, in a case where market manipulation
was suspected, but not sufficiently proved, tax return information might provide a link by
establishing an individual's dealings in the stock in question. Tax return information is also
particularly useful in investigating tax shelter schemes.
134 Id. at 150.
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U.S. Attorneys' offices in non-tax criminal investigations. 135 This
would include a showing that there is reasonable cause to believe
that a specific violation within the SEC's jurisdiction has been
committed. Access should also be permitted to other federal
agencies responsible for enforcing civil laws, provided they can
demonstrate to Congress a compelling need for such information.
As with Department of Justice investigations, we believe such a
procedure provides the proper balance between an investigating
agency's legitimate need for information and the taxpayer's right
to confidentiality.
IV
AcCESS BY THE PRESIDENT AND WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL
A. Tax Checks
The President and members of the White House staff have
frequently used tax returns and return information to conduct
"tax checks" on prospective appointees. 136 The information was
often obtained without the consent of the individual to whom the
information pertained.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Internal Revenue
Code provided that income tax returns "shall be open to inspec-
tion only upon order of the President and under rules and regu-
lations prescribed by the Secretary . . . . ',13 The Code did not
specifically provide for disclosure to the President. Under this
provision, however, Presidents issued rules and regulations pro-
viding for presidential and White House access to tax information
for the purpose of investigating prospective presidential appoin-
tees.138
Since 1961, when President Kennedy first wrote to Secretary
Dillon stating that he desired a check of tax records to supple-
ment the character investigations of certain prospective presiden-
tial appointees, 139 tax checks have frequently been performed at
the request of the President1 4 0 or heads of various federal agen-
'3 See I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(i)-(iii). See generally notes 90-100 and accompanying text
supra.
136 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 981.
137 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1975).
138 See, e.g., Executive Order No. 11,805, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,261 (1974).
139 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 985 n.608.
140 For example, the White House requested 547 tax checks in 1966. The number of
requests increased to 1045 in 1974. Id. at 988.
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cies.141 Checks have been made in connection with the appoint-
ment of individuals to numerous kinds of jobs, including post-
masters, judges, U.S. Attorneys and White House employees.'
42
The ostensible purpose of these requests is to avoid the
embarrassment of appointing an individual to an important gov-
ernment post who is in, or has been in, serious tax trouble.1
43
A tax check on a potential presidential appointee is initiated
by the White House office as part of a "security and conflicts re-
view." During this review, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) conducts a "full field investigation" which includes checks
with various confidential agencies, including the Internal Revenue
Service. Therefore, the inquiry to the Service comes from the FBI
rather than directly from the White House. The FBI reports the
tax check information to the White House Counsel's Office, which
transmits a report to the President.44
There have been a few demonstrated abuses of tax informa-
tion in connection with tax checks. The most notable was the
Watergate era revelation of evidence that the White House used
the tax check procedure to obtain data to use against Daniel
Schorr, a CBS newscaster. 43 Such abuses led to the Privacy
Commission's recommendation that tax checks be conditioned on
the prospective employee's consent.'46
Congress disagreed. By amending the Code provisions re-
garding tax return confidentiality in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
141 These include the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the Depart-
ment of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture. See id. at
988. The Privacy Commission noted in its Interim Report that the Department of Justice
requested tax information in 835 instances in 1974 in connection with the consideration of
judicial nominees. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 50.
14' See generally S. REP'. No. 94-938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 322 (1976), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEws 3439, 3752; ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at
987.
143 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 990. It has also been suggested that tax
information has some relevance to competence or fitness for a public job. Id. This does
not, however, justify the need for the disclosure of this information without first obtaining
the consent of the taxpayer.
"I S. REP. No. 94-938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 322 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3439, 3751-52. If the tax check is "negative," the Service informs
the requesting party: "Our records show that income tax returns were timely filed for
the [three year period]. There is no record of unpaid taxes, liens, criminal tax investiga-
tions, or civil penalties for fraud or negligence. This completes our report." ADMINISTRA-
TIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 986. If the tax check is positive, the department requesting
the tax check is so advised. Id. See text accompanying notes 149-52 infra.
145 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 991.
146 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 50.
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Congress endorsed the prior tax check practice.,47 Thus, section
6103(g)(2) of the Code now authorizes the disclosure to:
[a] duly authorized representative of the Executive Office of
the President or to the head of any Federal agency, upon writ-
ten request by the President or head of such agency, or to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation on behalf of and upon
written request by the President or such head, [of] return in-
formation with respect to an individual who is designated as
being under consideration for appointment to a position in the
executive or judicial branch of the Federal Government.
The Code does, however, require that the Service send written
notice to the affected taxpayer within three days of the receipt of
the request.
1 48
The Code also limits the information which the Service may
disclose in a tax check. The Service may only state whether the
prospective appointee (1) has filed returns for the immediately
preceding three years; 149 (2) has failed to pay any tax within ten
days after notice and demand or has been assessed any penalty
for negligence within the immediately preceding three years; 150
(3) has been or is under investigation for possible criminal of-
fenses under the Internal Revenue laws, and the results of any
such investigation; 151 or (4) has been assessed any civil penalty
under title 26 for fraud. 52
147 I.R.C. § 6103(g). It may be argued that Congress cannot constitutionally prevent the
President from obtaining access to information gathered and maintained by an agency
which reports to him. That issue is beyond the parameters of this article, although we note
that article II of the Constitution entitles the President to obtain information from gov-
ernment agencies for purposes of executing the laws. The Supreme Court, however, has
held that the President's authority is limited to execution of only those laws which have
been enacted by Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88
(1952).
141 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2).
149 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2)(A).
0 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2)(B).
1 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2)(C).
152 I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2)(D). The Code further provides that the tax information shall not
be disclosed to any employee of the White House or other federal agency who does not
earn a certain salary (I.R.C. § 6103(g)(4)); prohibits employees who receive tax information
from redisclosing it to other persons without the personal written direction of the Presi-
dent or head of the requesting agency (I.R.C. § 6103(g)(3)); and requires the President and
the head of any agency requesting returns to file a quarterly report with the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation setting forth the names and addresses of taxpayers with respect to whom
such requests have been made, the tax information involved, and the reasons for each
request (I.R.C. § 6103(g)(5)). The Code requires that the reports be maintained for a
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We see no legitimate governmental interest which is served by
precluding prior notice to the prospective appointee that a tax
check will be made.'53 If a prospective appointee does not wish
to disclose confidential tax information, he should be afforded an
opportunity to say so. If the appointing agency then withdraws
the person's name from consideration, at least the choice about
revealing the information will have been the candidate's.
Moreover, the prospective appointee may have no interest in the
particular job, and thus have no reason to reveal his tax return
information to anyone.
In its present form, the tax check mechanism has the poten-
tial for being unfair. When the Service discloses tax information
without the individual's knowledge, the individual has no oppor-
tunity to rebut adverse information which may be revealed.
Further, as in the celebrated Daniel Schorr incident, tax checks
permit the White House to use a prospective appointment as a
pretense to obtain potentially embarrassing information about
political enemies. Although the after-the-fact notification proce-
dure now incorporated into section 6103(g) reduces the potential
for such abuses, it does not eliminate them.
There is also a compelling argument to abolish the tax check
procedure altogether. The President or agency may obtain infor-
mation directly from the prospective appointee at little in-
convenience. If a person is anxious to obtain an appointment, he
should be willing to disclose such information or authorize the
Service to release it. Although the Administration would no
longer be able to obtain this information without making the tax-
payer aware that he is under consideration for an appointment,
period not exceeding two years, but prohibits disclosure unless the Committee believes that
disclosure would be in the "national interest." Reports are not required with respect to
requests for tax information pertaining to current employees of the Executive Branch. Id.
153 Our position is consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974, which, as a general rule,
prohibits the disclosure of tax information "to any person [without] the prior written con-
sent of, the individual to whom the record pertains .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). Al-
though tax checks made for the purpose of avoiding presidential embarrassment are not
compatible with the purpose for which the Service originally collected the information, the
"routine use" exception (see text accompanying notes 40-42 supra) had been interpreted by
the Office of Management and Budget to justify the release, without the consent of the
taxpayer, of tax information for all uses that were properly made of the information prior
to the enactment of the Privacy Act. Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,953
(1975). See generally ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 868.
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the need for secrecy has not been convincingly explained. Indeed,
even under current procedures, the Service must notify the pros-
pective appointee within three days after the request for the tax
check, whether or not the taxpayer is named for the job.1
54
B. Other Uses
While the pre-appointment tax check is the primary use made
by the White House of tax return information, the Code allows
the President to request information for any purpose. Section
6103(g)(1) permits the Service to disclose to the President, or
White House employees designated by him, "a return or return
information with respect to any taxpayer" named in a request,
without any limitation on what may be disclosed or the use to be
made of the information. The section requires only that the re-
quest be in writing; personally signed by the President; and
specify certain information, including the name and address of
the taxpayer whose return or return information is to be dis-
closed, the kind of return or return information which is to be
disclosed, the taxable period or periods covered, and the specific
reason why the inspection or disclosure is requested. 155 However,
the safeguards applicable to tax checks-prohibitions on redisclo-
sure, restrictions on access, and requirements for congressional
reports-also apply.'
56
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Code did not speci-
fically provide for presidential access to tax information. Begin-
ning with the Kennedy Administration, however, such access was
provided, for reasons other than tax checks on potential appoin-
tees, pursuant to various executive orders and under rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. 57 The
Service disclosed entire tax returns, parts of returns, and analyses
'5' I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2). It should be noted that the individual may well have notice of his
prospective appointment long before this time because the White House typically consults
with an individual's colleagues concerning his reputation, competency, and similar matters
prior to requesting tax data.
155 Id.
156 I.R.C.§§ 6103(g)(3), (4) & (5). It should be noted, however, that the provision requir-
ing post-disclosure notification does not apply to presidential requests which are not made
in connection with a tax check. See I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2).
157 See generally ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 968-71.
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of return information. 5 8  At times, data was provided pursuant
to oral requests by White House employees, apparently without
the knowledge of the President.'59
The primary justification offered for such presidential access
is that the information is necessary for investigations of "impro-
priety in connection with government activity." 160 The White
House, however, does not normally conduct such investigations;
they are within the province of the FBI, the Department of Jus-
tice and United States Attorneys' offices. As discussed above,' 6 '
the Code requires that in criminal non-tax situations, federal in-
vestigators must first obtain a court order to gain access to return
information. Presidential access without such a court order di-
rectly conflicts with that procedure.
There is also, of course, the Watergate experience to con
sider. Investigations revealed evidence that various Presidents had
misused tax information. For example, President Nixon allegedly
requested tax inforriation concerning the Reverend Billy Graham,
John Wayne, 162 and Lawrence O'Brien' 63 for improper political
purposes. The marginal benefit of allowing the President access to
tax information for investigations of "impropriety" is outweighed
by the risk that such information may be used improperly. There
is, moreover, evidence that such investigative use is unnecessary.
Former IRS Commissioner Alexander told the Privacy Commis-
sion in 1976 that no one at the White House had asked the Ser-
vice for tax returns for several years. 64 Under the cir-
cumstances, the White House should be hard pressed to justify
the need for such information now.
158 S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 321 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3751.
159 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 968-69.
160 See letter from Kenneth E. Belieu, Deputy Assistant to the President, to Senator Rus-
sell Long (April 28, 1970), cited in ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 981 n.595.
161 See notes 94-99 and accompanying text supra.
12 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 970 n.566 (citing Presidential Campaign
Activities, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11223-30 (1974) (testimony of Roger V. Barth)), reprinted in
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (testimony of John J. Caulfield)).
163 See S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 321 n.8 (1976) (citing Presidential
Campaign Activities of 1974: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11223-30 (1974) (testimony of Roger V. Barth)), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3751.
164 Hearings, supra note 46, at 48. See also ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 971.
1979]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:940
V
ACCESS BY STATE OFFICIALS
A. State Tax Administration
Section 6103(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended
by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, permits disclosure of tax returns
and return information to "any State agency ... which is charged
under the laws of such State with responsibility for the adminis-
tration of State tax laws for the purpose of, and only to the extent
necessary in, the administration of such laws .... ,, 165 Such dis-
closure is permitted "only upon written request by the head of
such agency .... and only to the representatives of such agency
... designated ... as the individuals who are to inspect or to
receive the return information .... ,,166 Furthermore, section
6103(a)(2) requires that officers and employees of a state treat
the tax information furnished by the Service as confidential.
Disclosure to state tax officials for tax purposes is appropriate,
especially where the taxpayer is reporting the same or similar
information to both the state and federal taxing authorities.'
67
There is considerable evidence that state tax collection is substan-
tially enhanced by allowing states access to federal informa-
tion. 168  Moreover, the taxpayer has no reason to complain that
he did not suspect that federal tax information about him would
165 I.R.C. § 6103(d).
166 Id. The chief executive officer of a state is not permitted access. Id. The Code also
provides for access to tax return information by state agencies regulating tax return pre-
parers. Such information may be furnished only upon written request and only for pur-
poses of licensing, registration or regulation of income tax return preparers. I.R.C. §
6103(k)(5).
1617 This is true regardless of whether the states are permitted access to federal tax in-
formation for use in connection with state tax administration or, in circumstances where
state taxing authorities administer taxes for municipalities in connection with their ad-
ministration of local tax laws. See INTERIM REPoRT, supra note 40, at 46.
168 Commissioner James H. Tully, Jr., testifying on behalf of the New York State De-
partment of Taxation, estimated that New York obtains approximately $30 million a year
in additional tax revenues as a result of its access to federal tax information. Hearings, supra
note 46, at 438. Similarly, the Governor of Florida estimated that his state would lose
some $ I1 million if they were denied access to this information. Id. at 470 (testimony of
Marion Lawless, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Florida Department of Revenue). A rep-
resentative from Wisconsin estimated that in 1975 his state collected over $1 million in
additional income taxes as a result of its access to federal tax information. Id. at 478-79
(testimony of Daniel Smith, Administrator of Income, Sales, Inheritance and Excise Taxes
for the State of Wisconsin).
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be disclosed to other taxing authorities. 1 69  Under the cir-
cumstances, we can see little reason why a taxing authority, be it
federal or state, should not be allowed to verify that the ap-
propriate tax is being paid.
Although permitting access by state tax officials to federal tax
information entails some increased risk of subsequent unauthorized
redisclosure, 7 ° the personal privacy of the taxpayer can be
adequately protected by the enactment of safeguards by the states,
the imposition of strict penalties by states for unauthorized disclo-
sure, and close scrutiny of state practices by the Service. The 1976
amendments to section 6103 171 are worthwhile efforts to prevent
unauthorized disclosure. Additional problems, however, still exist.
1. Scope of Disclosure
Section 6103(d) of the Code grants a state taxing authority
access to an individual's entire tax return, even though much of
the information included may be unnecessary to accomplish the
state's purpose in requesting the information. 72  The Code's only
limitation on disclosure to state tax officials is that returns and
return information be supplied "for the purpose of and only to
the extent necessary in, the administration of [state tax]
laws .... , 173
The Service should strive to limit access by the states to the
specific information actually needed. There is a mechanical prob-
lem, however, in limiting access to portions of returns. Tradition-
ally, states, pursuant to agreements with the federal government, have
inspected tax returns by examining either the whole return and
copying portions in a secured area of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, or by obtaining magnetic tapes drawn from the Services's
files.' 74  To effectively limit access, the Service will have to cull
169 Cooperation between the Internal Revenue Service and officials administering state
tax laws allows the taxing authorities involved to verify the accuracy of the information
which an individual has reported to each. Disclosure of individually identifiable tax infor-
mation to state tax administrators is compatible with the purposes for which information from
and about a taxpayer is collected, and serves the interest of effective and fair tax adminis-
tration. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 546.
170 The Privacy Commission noted in its Interim Report that unlawful disclosures of fed-
eral tax information by state officials had been rare. Indeed, the Commission encountered
only one instance in which a governor sought to use federal tax information for an unau-
thorized purpose. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 43.
171 See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
172 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 42.
173 I.R.C. § 6103(d).
174 ADMINIs-RATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 993.
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only pertinent information from these sources. The necessary
modifications will undoubtedly result in additional costs, 175 but, as
the Privacy Commission concluded, these costs are justified by the
reduced risk of unauthorized use.
17 6
The Privacy Commission recommended that the Service be
allowed to disclose individually identifiable IRS data to a state
agency responsible for tax administration for the sole purpose of
determining, validating or enforcing a taxpayer's liability under a
general revenue law of the state.1 77 States would be unable to
obtain federal tax information for use in administering toll collec-
tions, licensing or other regulatory laws which require the pay-
ment of a fee. 7 8 The Privacy Commission further recommended
that there be at least a general correspondence between the state
tax law for which the federal tax information is sought, and the
federal tax laws for which the information was collected.
179
Several witnesses who testified before the Privacy Commis-
sion, however, attested to the potential difficulty in deciding when
certain state tax laws are similar to federal provisions. 180  Their
testimony highlighted the serious practical problems in permitting
a state to use federal tax information for administering some, but
not all, of its tax laws. 1 81  In addition, several states may face
problems in determining what constitutes a "tax," as opposed to
other revenue-raising measures.
These problems could be avoided by permitting state access
to federal tax returns, regardless of the nature of the revenue-
raising measure. If the goal of permitting access is increased com-
pliance by taxpayers with state tax laws,18 2 state tax officials
175 The Privacy Commission noted in its Interim Report that it had been advised by the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service that, to determine, on a state-by-state basis,
exactly what data each requesting state would need for the enforcement of their tax laws
and to disclose only that data to the requesting state, would cost the Service approximately
$72,000 per year. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 42.
176 Id. at 42.
177 Id. at 41.
178 Id.
179 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 546.
IS' See, e.g. Hearings, supra note 46, at 246-47 (testimony of Sherwin P. Simmons, repre-
senting Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association). See also ADMINISTRATIVE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 999.
181 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 372-73 (testimony of Edgar Lindley, representing the
Ohio Department of Taxation).
182 Compliance should be enhanced at both levels of government by increased taxpayer
awareness of the cooperation between federal and state tax authorities. See AD.IINISTRATIVE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 998.
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should not be limited by the type of the local revenue-raising
measure. Broader access, however, compounds the risk of impro-
per use and disclosure; 183 the more state officials who have access
to such information, the greater the risk of improper use.
2. Safeguards and Penalties
The Internal Revenue Code provides certain safeguards
against unauthorized disclosure of federal tax information by the
states. Section 6103(p)(4) requires that states, at a minimum, must
establish and maintain a permanent system for recording all re-
quests; 184 keep the returns in a secure area; 185 and limit access to
those persons authorized to receive the information and whose
duties or responsibilities require such access.' 86  In addition, state
tax officials must furnish a report to the Service describing the
procedural safeguards established by the state.' 87  Moreover, the
Service may withhold tax data from state tax officials if adequate
safeguards are not established and maintained. 88
The Code does not require states to enact statutes prohibiting
the redisclosure of federal tax information for purposes other
than those for which it was originally requested. State tax officials
are required, however, to return the tax information to the IRS
when they are finished using it, or make arrangements to have it
destroyed. 89 In addition, states which require taxpayers to file
183 The Privacy Commission further recommended that disclosure of tax information to
state agencies be limited to the information on a federal income, estate or gift tax return
(i.e., Forms 1040, 1040A, 706 and 709) and accompanying schedules and summary infor-
mation regarding adjustments to such returns. INTERM REPORT, supra note 40, at 41. Sec-
tion 6103(d) of the Code, however, provides for disclosure of "returns and return informa-
tion," thereby including information received by the Service from third-party sources.
Neither the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 nor the testimony before the
Privacy Commission reveals a legitimate need on the part of the states for third-party
source material to administer their tax laws. In the absence of a demonstrated need, access
to third-party information should be denied.
184 I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4)(B).
185 I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4)(A).
188 I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4)(C).
187 I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4)(E). The Secretary of the Treasury is required, in turn, to report
to Congress concerning the procedures and safeguards established by the states. I.R.C. §
6103(p)(5). Moreover, the Code permits the Comptroller General to monitor the proce-
dures and safeguards established and requires him to furnish an annual report setting
forth his findings with respect to any audit conducted. I.R.C. § 6 103 (p)(6 ).
188 I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4).
1s9 See I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4)(F).
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copies of their federal tax returns with their state tax forms must,
as a condition to receiving tax information from the Service, enact
laws protecting the confidentiality of the federal tax information
attached to or reflected on. the state tax return.1 90
The safeguards noted above were, in large part, recom-
mended by the Privacy Commission '9' and incorporated into the
Internal Revenue Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Although these provisions are salutary, additional measures are
necessary to protect the taxpayer from unauthorized redisclosure
of individually identifiable federal tax information.
States should be required to enact laws prohibiting re-
disclosure of tax information to persons not listed on the written
request submitted to the Service or for purposes unrelated to that
request. These laws should also ban the redisclosure of federal tax
information attached to or included on state tax returns for pur-
poses other than state tax administration. As presently drafted,
section 6103(p)(8)(B) permits disclosure of copies of federal tax re-
turns to state employees for purposes other than state tax ad-
ministration, provided the federal tax information is attached to
or included on the state tax return and redisclosure is specifically
authorized by state law.
The penalty provisions for unauthorized disclosure should,
also be broadened. Although section 7213(a)(2) of the Code
makes it a felony for state employees to disclose federal tax in-
formation obtained from the Service, 192 there is no penalty pro-
vided for unauthorized disclosure of federal tax information
which is supplied directly by state taxpayers in connection with
their state tax returns. The Privacy Commission 193 recommended
that states, as a condition to obtaining individually identifiable
data from the Service, enact statutes imposing penalties sub-
stantially similar to those of section 7213 for such unauthorized
disclosure.'
9 4
o I.R.C. § 6103(p)(8)(A).
'g INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 44.
192 Unauthorized disclosure is punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment
for not more than 5 years. See discussion at notes 283-87 and accompanying text infra.
193 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 43.
194 This proposal would not affect a state legislature's authority to permit the disclosure
of state tax information to another state agency. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at
43-44. It would, however, alleviate the difficulties that may arise in attempting to prosecute
an individual for unauthorized disclosure of federal tax information obtained from the
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The threat of either federal or state prosecution for unau-
thorized disclosure would serve as a substantial deterrent against
unlawful disclosures. State enforced penalties have the advantage
of placing the burden of prosecution on the state which enjoys the
benefit of federal tax information. State prosecution will also
lessen the chance that unauthorized disclosures would go
unpunished because of the difficulty in determining whether the
Service was the source of the federal tax information.
1 9 5
B. Non-Tax Purposes
The Code continued past practice by prohibiting access by the
states to federal tax information for purposes unrelated to state
tax administration without prior consent of the taxpayer.' 9 6  Such
use is clearly incompatible with the purpose for which the infor-
mation was originally obtained. There are a number of legitimate
non-tax uses for tax information; for example, state welfare
agents could use the information to uncover welfare fraud.197 If
access were granted, Congress would have to develop an ex parte
procedure similar to that imposed on the Department of Jus-
tice.' 9 8  It is highly questionable whether the enormous burden
that requests by fifty states would impose on the federal court
system is worth undertaking. State review would result in a lack of
uniformity in the decisionmaking process. In short, access by
states for non-tax purposes is probably best left as it is-
forbidden.
Service where that information has been commingled with similar information obtained by
the state directly from the taxpayer.
t95 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 548; ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at
997. See note 194 supra. Enactment of appropriate legislation by states may take time, espe-
cially in those states where the legislature meets biennially. To obviate that problem, the
Privacy Commission recommended that a state be permitted to continue receiving federal
tax information for a period of two years after the adoption of the foregoing recommenda-
tions by Congress, pending the enactment of the necessary statute by its legislature. If,
however, the necessary state legislation has not been enacted by the end of the two-year
period, the Service should be required to discontinue the disclosure of federal tax informa-
tion until the necessary statute is enacted. See INTERIM REPORT, Supra note 37, at 44.
1 See I.R.C. § 6103(d).
'9 See Hearings, supra note 46, at 451-52 (testimony of Owen L. Clarke, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Federation of Tax Administration and Commissioner of Corpora-
tions and Taxation for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).




ACCESS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, local tax authorities
were permitted access to federal tax return information for pur-
poses of local tax administration.' 99 Tax information was furnished
upon written request of the governor to the state tax officials
who, in turn, distributed it to local taxing authorities. 20 0  Al-
though there was no statutory limitation on the amount or type of
information which could be obtained,2 0 1 as a matter of practice,
the information usually consisted of no more than name, address,
social security number and type of return filed. 2  The informa-
tion was used primarily to identify individuals who may have
failed to file their local government tax return. °3
The Tax Reform Act halted the disclosure of federal returns
and return information to local tax authorities. With the excep-
tion of information concerning tax return preparers, °4 no infor-
mation may be disclosed to localities, either directly from the Ser-
vice or indirectly through state tax authorities. 20 5  If states permit
unauthorized disclosures of such information to local govern-
ments, the Service can, among other alternatives, deny subsequent
requests for tax information.20 6
Pre-Amendment § 6103(b) permitted tax information to be "furnished to any official,
body, or commission of any political subdivision" of a state "upon written request of the
governor." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 61, § 6103(b)(2), 68A Stat. 753 (repealed 1976).
Income tax information, however, was not furnished directly by the Service to local gov-
ernments. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
200 See S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 336 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3765; Hearings, supra note 46, at 395 (testimony of Edgar
Lindley on behalf of the Ohio Department of Taxation).
201 The Code provided that federal tax information "may be furnished only for the
purpose of, and may be used only for, the administration of [the] tax laws [of the locality]."
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 61, § 6103(b)(2). 68A Stat. 753 (repealed in 1976).
202 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 46. Hearings, supra note 46, at 396 (testimony of
Edgar Lindley on behalf of the Ohio Department of Taxation).
203 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 46.
204 I.R.C. § 6103(k)(5) permits the disclosure of tax preparer identity information (in-
cluding name, mailing address, and taxpayer identifying number) to any state or local
agency, body, or commission charged with the licensing, registration or regulation of tax
return preparers. See S. REP. No. 938 (PART 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1976), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3439, 3768; note 166 supra
205 Nor does the Code authorize the use of federal tax data by state officials in adminis-
tering local tax laws. The 1976 revisions, however, were not intended to limit the disclosure
of state tax returns and return information by state tax officials. See S. REP. No. 938 (PART
I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 338 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439,
3768.
206 See I.R.C. See 6103(p)(4); note 200-05 and accompanying text supra.
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Several witnesses at the Privacy Commission hearings argued
in favor of access by local governments to federal tax information.
Edgar Lindley, Commissioner of the Ohio Department of Taxa-
tion, testified that municipal and local tax administrators would be
severely handicapped if they were denied access to IRS files be-
cause they do not have names, addresses or social security num-
bers in their files.2 °7 Without federal tax information, some
localities may be unable to determine who should be paying taxes.
One community representative told the Privacy Commission that
fifteen to twNenty-five percent of its collections would be lost if the
community were deprived of federal returns.0 8
Local officials apparently did not abuse the access afforded
them prior to 1976. Commissoner Alexander noted in his tes-
timony before the Privacy Commission that there had been some
complaints alleging disclosure of confidential information by local
officials.2 0 9  However, other witnesses stated that while
documented abuses had occurred at the national level of govern-
ment, they were not aware of any unauthorized disclosures at
either the state or local levels.210 None of the witnesses who tes-
tified at the hearings conducted by the Privacy Commission ob-
jected to the disclosure of tax information to local jurisdictions,
provided confidentiality could be maintained. David Martin, Re-
gional Director of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, specifically recommended that the Service be authorized to
disclose tax returns to state officials for redisclosure by them to
local taxing authorities.
2 11
To protect the confidentiality of the tax information disclosed
to local governments, the procedural safeguards now required of
the states, 212 as well as the additional safeguards noted, 21  should
211 Hearings, supra note 46, at 374.
208 See id. at 294-95 (statement by David F. Linowes, Chairman of the Privacy Commis-
sion). Accord, id. at 383 (testimony of Richard E. O'Brien, Chairman of the Tax Commit-
tee of the Ohio Municipal League and commissioner of Taxation for the City of Toledo,
Ohio); id. at 398 (testimony of John R. Urban, testifying on behalf of the Regional Income
Tax Agency for the Suburban Cleveland area).
209 Testimony of Donald C. Alexander before the third meeting of the Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission (September 9, 1975) at 235 (transcript on file at the Cornell Law
Review).
210 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 46, at 385 (testimony of John R. Urban on behalf of the
Regional Income Tax Agency of the Suburban Cleveland area); id. at 393 (testimony of
Edgar Lindley on behalf of the Ohio Department of Taxation).
211 Id. at 262.
212 See I.R.C. § 6103(p); notes 184-90 and accompanying text supra.
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be made applicable to municipalities as a condition for receiving
the information. In addition, local officials should be subject to
state laws or local ordinances which prohibit the use of the infor-
mation for purposes other than tax administration, and which
impose strict penalties for unauthorized redisclosures.2 14
The Privacy Commission recommended that local govern-
ments should be able to obtain federal tax information for pur-
poses of local tax administration,21 5 but that the information be
limited to a taxpayer's name, address, social security number, and
type of return filed.21n  Disclosure of limited amounts of federal
tax information is generally compatible with the purpose for
which the information was originally obtained-the collection of
taxes. Although access to such information provides some in-
creased risk of unauthorized disclosures, the need demonstrated
by local governments for this information outweighs the minimal
risk that the information will be misused, especially if adequate
safeguards are maintained, strict penalties are imposed for unau-





Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, any member of a con-
gressional tax committee could obtain identifiable tax information
simply by asking for it. The information could then be used at a
213 See notes 191-94 and accompanying text supra.
214 For example, ordinances in Ohio contain penalties of $1,000 for each offense. Hear-
ings, supra note 46, at 386 (testimony of John R. Urban on behalf of the Regional Income
Tax Agency of the Ohio Department of Taxation). See 57 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5715.99
(Page 1973).
21' See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 47; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 548.
216 Although there was some evidence presented at the Privacy Commission hearings
which would indicate that this information would not be sufficient to satisfy the needs of
'-ertain municipalities, the primary use of federal tax information by localities appears to be
tor the purpose of locating taxpayers. In this respect, the recommended disclosures should
be adequate. More expansive disclosures, consistent with. the principle of disclosure on a
i,eed-to-know basis, would necessitate tailoring the information and monitoring system to
the needs of each locality-an expense which would appear neither warranted nor neces-
sar. It should be noted that the Code permits access by local government officials to
certain federal tax information for use in locating absent parents. See I.R.C. § 6103(1)(6).
217 Access by local governments to federal tax information for purposes other than local
tax administration, however, is neither necessary nor justified. Such access is not currently
permitted, nor was it authorized by the pre-1976 Code. Moreover, we are aware of no new
[Vol. 64:940
ACCESS TO TAX RETURNS
public session of the committee.21 Despite the ease of access,
between 1965 and 1975 there apparently were no more than six
requests for income tax returns by tax committees. 219  The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 nevertheless restricted disclosure and redis-
closure of confidential tax information by congressional tax com-
mittees. Only the chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House, the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the
Joint Committee on Taxation may obtain tax information. 220  Un-
less the taxpayer consents, this information may be used only in
closed sessions of the committee.22' Unfortunately, the Tax Re-
form Act also permits redisclosure of tax information to the full
House or Senate without any requirement that confidentiality be
protected.222 Thus, while the committee sessions are closed, the
committee report which might reveal identifiable tax information
may be publicized. Moreover, an individual member of Congress
may place information in the Congressional Record which identifies
a particular taxpayer.
Conceding that tax return information should be available
to congressional committees responsible for drafting tax
legislation-and that there is some evidence that various
congressional studies of tax reform measures have made impor-
tant use of tax return data 223-- 'no compelling argument has been
made fo'r giving congressmen information which can be identified
with a particular taxpayer. 224  Given the paucity of committee re-
quests over the past ten years, 225 it is clear that they have no real
persuasive reason which has been advanced in favor of local governments obtaining access
to federal tax data for purposes unrelated to tax administration.
218 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 61, § 6103(d), 68A Stat. 753 (repealed 1976).
219 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 960.
220 I.R.C. § 6103(0(1). Such disclosure may only be made upon the written request of
the committee chairman to the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 6103(f)(2) also permits
disclosure to the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation upon his written re-
quest to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Chief of Staff may in turn submit the informa-
tion to a tax committee, provided that if the information identifies a particular taxpayer,
the committee is sitting in closed executive session.
221 I.R.C. § 6103(f)(1).
222 I.R.C. § 6103(f)(4)(A).
223 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, .supra note 1, at 968.
224 The legislative history of § 6103 is largely silent with respect to the need for congres-
sional access to tax returns and tax return information. The Privacy Commission included
no study of congressional access in its report, and the Administrative Report, which con-
cluded that identifiable information should not be available to Congress, presented no ar-
guments in support of congressional accesss.
225 See text accompanying note 219 supra.
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need for such information. Considering the risk of disclosure, the
public would be better served if congressional tax committees
were denied any access to identifiable tax information.
B. Non-Tax Committees
Prior to 1976, non-tax committees frequently obtained tax re-
turns and return information pursuant to an executive order
from the President and a committee or subcommittee resolu-
tion.226 From the 90th Congress to the 94th Congress, various
non-tax committees made 48 requests concerning 634 tax-
payers.227 At least one committee, the House Committee on
Government Operations, regularly requested and received a blan-
ket executive order at the commencement of each Congress cover-
ing any tax information it might thereafter wish to see, rather
than requesting an executive order each time specific tax informa-
tion was desired.228
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended the Code to make
access to individually identifiable tax information by non-tax
committees more difficult. The Service may disclose information
only to those committees that have been specially authorized by
resolution of the full House or Senate.229 The congressional res-
olution must specify the purpose for which the return or return
information is sought and stipulate that the requested information
is not "reasonably" available from an alternative source.
230
Tax return information, arguably, can be used beneficially by
some non-tax congressional committees. For example, committees
which have drafting and oversight responsibility for certain fed-
eral subsidy programs might use identifiable tax information to
determine whether applicants are concealing income from their
application forms. Once applicants are approved, tax information
could be used to ascertain whether recipients of federal monies
continue to meet prescribed income levels. In fact, investigative
use has been the most frequently cited reason for requests of tax
return information by non-tax congressional committees.
23
1
226 S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 319 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3749.
227 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 960-61.
228 Letter from Chet Holifield, Chairman, House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, to Wilbur Mills, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means (July 13, 1973),
cited in ADMINIsTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at n.550.
229 I.R.C. § 6103(0(3).
230 Id.
231 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 962-65.
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There are, however, substantial arguments against disclosing
individually identifiable tax information to congressional com-
mittees for non-tax purposes. Such use is incompatible with the
purpose for which the tax information was originally submitted to
the government. There is also the risk of improper political use,
although there appears to be no record of such abuse. Further,
there is the difficulty of protecting confidentiality. A 1970 survey
by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation revealed
significant variations in the security measures taken by the com-
mittees which had requested tax information.232
As previously discussed, 233 Justice Department lawyers seek-
ing identifiable tax information for non-tax purposes must first
obtain a federal court order permitting access upon a showing,
among other things, of reasonable cause to believe a particular
crime has been committed. We see no logic in permitting congres-
sional access by any different means or by any less of a showing.
Alternative means for checking misuse of federal funds exist.
For example, an applicant for a federal subsidy could be required
to submit his tax returns or to waive the prohibition on disclosure
as a condition to obtaining the funds.
One problem has been partially eliminated by the Tax Re-
form Act. Prior to 1976, a committee which had obtained tax in-
formation could submit it to the full House or the Senate.234 The
Service had construed the pre-1976 provision to permit publica-
tion of information in a committee report, thereby providing a
means of avoiding confidentiality.235 The problem was partially
alleviated by section 6103(f)(4)(B), which provides that when
non-tax committees submit tax return information to the full
House or Senate, it must be done in "closed executive session" if
the information is in identifiable form and the taxpayer has not
consented in writing.
236
While this limitation on the use of identifiable information by
congressional non-tax committees is a salutary first step, we be-
lieve that tax returns should be disclosed only to congressional tax
0
232 See id.
233 See discussion at notes 94-100 and accompanying text supra.
234 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 61, § 6103(d)(1)(c), 68A Stat. 753 (repealed in 1976).
235 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 967.
236 I.R.C. § 6103(f)(4)(B). There would appear to be little reason for distinguishing bet-
ween tax and non-tax committees in requiring that individually identifiable information be
submitted to the full House or Senate only in closed executive session. The privacy consid-
erations are the same regardless of which committee is responsible for transmitting the
information.
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committees,237 and even then, only in unidentifiable form. Absent
a showing of "reasonable cause"-or its non-criminal functional
equivalent-in an ex parte proceeding, no congressional committee
should be granted access to identifiable tax information.
VIII
STATISTICAL USE OF TAX RETURNS
Prior to 1976, the regulations promulgated under section
6103 specifically provided for the inspection of individually'iden-
tifiable238 tax returns and return information by certain govern-
ment agencies-including the Department of Commerce, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission-for the purpose of compiling statistical data.
239
The Privacy Commission study concluded that only the Bureau of
the Census, a part of the Department of Commerce, had "clearly"
demonstrated the need for information about individuals in iden-
tifiable form, but that the Department of the Treasury might be
able to demonstrate such a need in the future.240  The Code was
subsequently amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to provide
the Bureau of the Census 241 and the Department of the Treas-
ury 2 4  access to identifiable tax return information.
237 See Hearings, supra note 46, at 172 (testimony of Sheldon Cohen, former I.R.S.
Commissioner).
238 Many government agencies receive non-identifiable tax information for statistical
purposes. Such use is outside the scope of this article.
239 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-102, T.D. 6375, 1959-1 C.B. 679 (S.E.C.); Treas. Reg. §
301.6103(a)-103, T.D. 6570, 1976-2 C.B. 229 (Advisory Commission in Intergovernmental
Relations); Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-104, T.D. 6547, 1961-1 C.B. 698 (Department of
Commerce); Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-106, T.D. 6545, 1961-1 C.B. 695 (F.T.C.); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6103(a)-107, T.D. 6816, 1965-1 C.B. 537 (Federal Reserve System). All of the
above regulations were repealed in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 55760 (1978).
240 INTERIM JREPORT, supra note 40, at 47-49. The Privacy Commission noted that besides
the Bureau of the Census and ¢Department of Treasury, only the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Federal Trade Commission used identifiable tax information. Neither of
the latter two, however, used tax information about individuals, only about legal and busi-
ness entities. Id. Pre-1976 Treasury regulations permitted SEC access, but the legislative
history of the Tax Reform Act noted that as of 1976 the SEC did not use tax information
for statistical purposes because the function for which the SEC had required the informa-
tion had been shifted to the Federal Trade Commission. S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 333 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3762-
63.
241 I.R.C. § 6103(j)(1).
242 I.R.C. § 6103(j)(3).
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A. The Bureau of the Census
Section 6103(j) of the Code provides that the Bureau of the
Census may upon written request obtain tax returns or return in-
formation "for the purpose of, but only to the extent necessary in,
the structuring of censuses and national economic accounts and
conducting related statistical activities authorized by law."243  Regu-
lations promulgated after the enactment of the 1976 amendments
preserved the scope of available information but provided that the
Service could not disclose the taxpayer's name.244 A 1978
amendment to the regulation makes it possible for the Bureau to
obtain the taxpayer's name "where necessary to evaluate the com-
pleteness of census coverage."245
The Bureau of the Census has made a convincing argument
for access to identifiable tax information. According to the legisla-
tive history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976:
The Bureau uses information from tax returns to assist in pre-
paring the Economic Indicators, the Survey of Minority-owned
Business Enterprises, and the Survey of County Business Pat-
terns. The Economic Census (conducted every five years) is
used for the Index of Industrial Production (of the Federal Re-
serve Board), the Index of Wholesale Prices (of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics), and the Gross National Product accounts. The
Current Economic Indicators include information on retail
sales, manufacturers' shipments, orders and inventories, invest-
ment, and are used for the Index of Industrial Production
(Federal Reserve Board). These statistics are used as a basis for
national economic policy, for distributing funds by agencies, by
State and local governments in determining their programs,
and by private business in forecasting, marketing, investment,
etc.
24 6
243 I.R.C. § 6103(j)(1).
244 Treas. Reg. § 404.6103(j)(1)-l(b)(1), T.D. 7471, 1977-1 C.B. 380 (amended 1977).
245 Treas. Reg. § 404.6103(j)(1)-l(b)(1)(i), T.D. 7581, 1977-5 I.R.B. 18. To conduct
demographic, economic and agricultural statistics programs, the Bureau of the Census may
also obtain limited information from certain schedules accompanying the federal income
tax returns filed by individuals. Treas. Reg. § 404.6103(j)(1)-1(b)(2).
246 S. REP. No. 938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 331-32 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3761. The Senate Report also noted that: in 1975, Census
obtained 8,400,000 Business Master File Entity Change Records showing employer identifi-
cation number (EIN), name, address, and zip code; and 21,200,000 Forms 941 showing
EIN, total compensation, FICA wages, taxable tips, master file account, tax period, and
address change. Id. at n.10. See also ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 881-86;
Hearings, supra note 40, at 110-11.
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The Bureau uses identifiable tax information to correlate
data it has gathered with data supplied by the Service. For exam-
ple, the Bureau collects information on an establishment basis; the
Service, however, collects information on a legal entity basis.
2 47
In order to tabulate data on multi-establishment firms, the
Bureau must cull out duplications in the Service information.248
Because current law prohibits the disclosure of Bureau informa-
tion to the Service,2 49 were the Bureau denied access to identifi-
able tax information, the Bureau would have to increase its data
gathering capability-a costly burden 25' and one duplicative of
the Service's efforts.
Such duplication is unnecessary. The Bureau has had an
exemplary record in protecting the confidentiality of tax informa-
tion.251 Moreover, section 6103 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder provide substantial security measures with respect to
statistical use of this information.252 The Bureau's sole function is
statistical tabulation and analysis; it should be neutral and objec-
tive.253 In addition, the Bureau does not have a functional rela-
tionship with other subdivisions of the Department of Commerce.254
It is therefore probable that the information will remain within
the Bureau. There is little to be gained in further hindering the
Bureau's access to information.
B. The Department of the Treasury
The Privacy Commission noted that while the Department of
the Treasury appeared to use tax information for statistical pur-
poses, the Commission could not determine whether that depart-
ment needed identifiable information for those purposes. The
Commission recommended that the department should be
granted identifiable tax information only if it could show a clear
need.255
247 ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1070 n.251.
248 Id.
249 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
250 The Bureau of the Census at one point estimated that it would cost an additional $30
to $65 million to prepare the fi,ve-year Economic Indicators if it were denied access to
individually identifiable federal tax information. ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at
882.
251 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 48.
252 See I.R.C. § 6 103 (p)(4 ).
253 See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 885.
'5' See id. at 879-86.
255 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 40, at 49.
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The Tax Reform Act permits such disclosure "for the pur-
pose of, but only to the extent necessary in, preparing economic
or financial forecasts, projections, analyses, and statistical studies
and conducting related activities." 256  Because the request for
such information must be in writing and must set forth the
"specific reason or reasons why such inspection or disclosure is
necessary,"257 it is likely the requesting party will ask only for
truly necessary information. As the Privacy Commission con-
cluded, "[d]ependence upon written requests with articulated ob-
jectives should deter unjustified disclosures." 258
Written requests, coupled with the Tax Reform Act's provi-
sion prohibiting redisclosure of identifiable information, 259 and
the imposition of criminal sanctions for such redisclosure, should
prevent any serious problem.2 60  However, given the almost total
absence of any indication from the Department of the Treasury as
to why it needs identifiable information, its requests for tax data
in the future should be monitored to determine whether there is
such need.
Ix
REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
A. Criminal Penalties
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, sec-
tion 7213 of the Code provided that it was a misdemeanor
punishable by up to a $1,000 fine or one year in prison or both
(1) for an officer or employee of the United States to divulge or
permit inspection of certain information about a taxpayer's in-
come without authority; or (2) for an officer or employee of a
state or local government to make an unauthorized disclosure of
information furnished to the government pursuant to section
6103 of the Code. 61
256 I.R.C. § 6103(j)(3).
257 Id.
258 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 549.
259 I.R.C. § 6103(D(4).
260 See I.R.C. § 7213. In addition, the Treasury Department should, like the Bureau of
the Census, be required by statute to establish safeguards as a condition of receiving such
information.
262 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7213, 68A Stat. 855-56, amended by Pub. L. No.
85-866, 72 Stat. 1666 (1958), Pub. L. No. 68-778, 75 Stat. 940-41 (1960) (repealed 1976).
The Privacy Act of 1974 made the following persons liable for a maximum jail term of one
year and/or a fine of $5,000:
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The Tax Reform Act increased the offense under section
7213 from a misdemeanor to a felony, punishable by a $5,000
fine or five years in prison or both.2 62  The statute now applies to
the unauthorized disclosure of all information about an indi-
vidual, whether filed by that individual or collected by the Service
from third parties.26 3  The revisions make additional persons sub-
ject to the criminal penalties: former employees of federal, state
and local governments; agents (including contractors) of the fed-
eral government; and local child support officials. 264  The Tax
Reform Act preserved the prior requirement that a federal officer
or employee be discharged upon conviction of the crime. 265
The increase in the potential penalty for unauthorized disclo-
sure reflects the strong congressional policy in favor of confiden-
tiality. The Privacy Commission, which had chastised Congress for
not enacting all its proposed confidentiality provisions, had ar-
gued against increasing the penalty to a felony because felony
treatment "might present practical problems in obtaining convic-
tions." 266  The irony should not be lost: the Privacy Commission
was worried that juries would not be as concerned with confiden-
tiality of their tax returns as Congress thought they should be.
B. Civil Remedies
It was not until the Privacy Act of 1974 that a civil action
could be brought against an agency making unauthorized disclo-
sure of taxpayer information.267 If the agency is found to have
(1) Any officer or employee of an agency.... who knowing that disclosure of
the specific material is prohibited, willfully discloses the material in any
manner to any person or agency not entitled to receive it ....
(2) Any officer or employee of any agency who willfully maintains a system of
records without meeting the notice requirements ....
(3) Any person who knowingly and willfully requests or obtains any record con-
cerning an individual from an agency under false pretenses ....
5 U.S.C. 552a(i) (1976).
These provisions are undercut, however, by the Privacy Act's broad exceptions. See
text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
262 I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1).
263 Section 7213(a)(1) prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of any return or return in-
formation, as those terms are defined by section 6103(b) of the Code. See note 53 supra.
264 I.R.C. §§ 7213(a)(1) to (3).
265 I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1).
266 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 559. The Privacy Conmission, however, agreed
with the increase in the maximum amount of the fine from $1,000 to $5,000. Id.
267 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1976). The Privacy Act provides that individuals who have been
adversely affected by a federal agency's failure to comply with the Privacy Act, including
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acted intentionally or willfully, the United States is liable for ac-
tual damages in an amount of not less than $1,000, together with
costs and attorney's fees.26 The minimum award reflects the dif-
ficulty an aggrieved taxpayer may have in proving actual dam-
ages.
The Tax Reform Act added section 7217 to the Code. This
section establishes a civil remedy for any taxpayer damaged by an
unlawful disclosure.269 It provides that any person who knowingly
or negligently discloses any taxpayer return information in viola-
tion of section 6103 is liable for damages in the same amount
provided under the Privacy Act (not less than $1,000), but is not
liable for attorneys' fees.270  The violator may also be liable for
punitive damages where the disclosure was willful or the result of
gross negligence. 27 ' A subsequent amendment to section 7217
offers greater protection to the malfeasor by providing that dis-
closures resulting "from a good faith, but erroneous, interpreta-
tion of section 6103" are not actionable.
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CONCLUSION
Each of the confidentiality provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 must be viewed in light of the varying and competing
policy considerations. Not every governmental request for tax in-
formation can or should be treated identically.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 went a long way toward recog-
nizing that tax information should be viewed as confidential by
stopping the relatively free availability of federal tax returns to a
wide variety of government agencies for an even wider variety of
uses. Additional reforms are still necessary, however, to ensure
that tax information is used primarily for its intended purpose of
revenue collection, and that the reasonable privacy expectations of
the individual taxpayer are respected.
unauthorized disclosure of information, may bring a civil action against the agency. 5
U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(D) and (4).
21 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1976).
269 I.R.C. § 7217.
270 I.R.C. § 7217(a).
27 I.R.C. § 7217(c)(1).
272 Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2923 (1978) (codified at I.R.C. § 7217(b)).
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